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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 02-3586
___________
JILL B. KEARNS; RICHARD E. KEARNS
   v.
ESSEX SOURCE REALTY GROUP, LLC; ANTON F. KUPPECK LANDSCAPING,
INC.; EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE; JOHN DOE, (Nos. 1-5); JANE ROE,
(Nos. 1-5), unknown servants, agents, employees, corporation, partnerships, or company
of known defendants
v.
ESSEX SOURCE REALTY GROUP, LLC,
Third-party plaintiff
EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE; FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
Third-party defendants
Federal Insurance Company,
Appellant
________________________
                                          
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
District Court Judge: The Honorable Mary L. Cooper
(D.C. No. 00-cv-03784)
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 6, 2004
* Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
     This case falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a), as there is complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.
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BEFORE: SLOVITER and FUENTES, Circuit Judges,
and POLLAK, District Judge.*
(Opinion Filed: May 17, 2004)
________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
This case involves a dispute between two insurers over the priority of coverage under
their respective policies.1  In August 1998, Jill Kearns, an employee of Educational Testing
Service (“ETS”), fell as she was leaving work and sustained serious injuries.  Kearns brought
a negligence suit against ETS; Appellee Essex Source Realty Group (“Essex”), the lessor of
ETS’s office space; and Anton Kuppeck Landscaping (“Anton”), who provided landscaping
for the building.  Essex filed a third-party complaint against Appellant Vigilant Insurance
Company (“Vigilant”), ETS’s insurer, seeking coverage as an “additional insured” for any
damages owed by Essex to Kearns.  Kearns’s action was subsequently settled for $100,000,
of which Essex paid $87,500 and Anton the remaining $12,500.  Vigilant and Travelers
Property Casualty Company (“Travelers”), Essex’s insurer, split the $87,500 cost, each
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reserving the right to sue the other for full contribution.  In October 2001, Vigilant and
Travelers each filed a motion seeking to place responsibility for the full $87,500 cost with
the other insurer, based on interpretation of their insurance policies’ respective “Other
Insurance” clauses.  The District Court ruled that Vigilant’s coverage had priority over
Travelers’, meaning that Vigilant was primarily liable for the $87,500 and Travelers’ was
only liable for any excess over Vigilant’s coverage.  Since Vigilant’s coverage limit exceeded
$87,500, the District Court’s ruling effectively placed the burden for the entire $87,500 on
Vigilant.
On appeal, Vigilant argues that Travelers’ policy is ambiguous as to whether it has
lower or equal priority relative to Vigilant’s policy: specifically, the main text of the
Travelers policy and a subsequent endorsement (#1197) make no mention of policy priority,
while a second endorsement (#0192) explicitly states that any other insurer’s policy will get
priority over Travelers’ policy.  Essex (defended by Travelers) responds that the policy is not
ambiguous because Endorsement #0192 is the only provision targeting additional insureds
in particular and is therefore controlling.  Upon examination of the Travelers policy, we
agree with Essex that the policy is not ambiguous.  Endorsement #0192 is titled “OTHER
INSURANCE–ADDITIONAL INSUREDS,” and explicitly dictates that the Travelers policy
“is excess over any of the other insurance . . . [t]hat is valid and collectible insurance
available to you if you are added as an additional insured under any other policy.”  App. at
325.  This provision explicitly subordinates the Travelers policy to the Vigilant policy, as
     Because we find that the Travelers policy is unambiguous, the parties’ argument over how to
resolve any alleged ambiguity is rendered moot.
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Essex is an additional insured under Vigilant’s policy.
No other Travelers policy provision or endorsement contradicts Endorsement #0192.
It is true that two other sections of the policy discussing excess insurance do not cover
prioritizations of policies, but that does not create an ambiguity.  Rather, we read the
Travelers policy as unambiguously stating that in the specific context of additional insureds,
the Travelers policy will be subordinated to other additional insured coverage.  The silence
of the main text and Endorsement #1197 as to policy prioritization does not undercut this
clear statement, as neither of those provisions deals with additional insured coverage.
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s judgment.2
